This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to…
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/.,:. ,.... . . THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
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R ECONNA ISSANCE
The U-2 and OX C.\RT
Programs, 1954 - 1974
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Gregory 'vV. Pedlow and :>~~::.< :;;~..:.,·
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Secret l<JOFOFU'il
The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Secret
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~ec, et MOFORf~
The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Gregory W . Pedlow
and
Donald E. Welzenbach
History Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D .C.
1992
Sec,et
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♦ Chapter 1
Searching for a System
The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4
The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17
The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19
The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21
British Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23
The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24
The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27
A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32
CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33
♦ Chapter 2
Developing the U-2
The Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39
Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43
Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45
The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48
Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56
Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59
The CIA - Air Force Partnership .............................................................. 60
Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61
Delivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66
Initial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68
U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72
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Sec, el NOFORN
Hiring U-2 Pilots ........_................................................................................. 73
Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75
Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76
Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79
Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80
Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82
The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84
AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88
The U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89
♦ Chapter 3
U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958
The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94
The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95
President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96
First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100
First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104
Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109
The End of the Bomber Gap................................. :................................ 111
Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112
Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122
Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128
The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133
Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135
The Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139
Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142
Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143
Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147
More Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149
Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152
British Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153
The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 ........................................... 157
♦ Chapter 4
The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960
The U-2 and the "Missile-Gap" Debate................................................ 159
The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170
The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177
The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181
The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183
Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187
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Geeret PJOFORN
..'t', Chapter 5
U-2 Operations After M ay 1960
U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca ................ ...................... ................... .. 197
U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. ..... ............ .............. ....... 197
Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ........................... ........ ....... .. 198
U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199
U-2s Over South America ............. ..................................................... 211
U-2 Operations in Asia ........ ........................... ......................................... 211
Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ............... .... ..... 211
China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ................................ ..... ..... 215
U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216
U-2Cs for Detachment C....................... .................... ... ....................... 217
U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219
End of Detachment C Operations ...................................... ............... 219
Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221
New Detachment on Taiwan ......... ......... ........................................... 222
Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ............................ ....... 230
U-2s in India ................. ........................................................................ 231
Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233
Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237
Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238
.............................. ......... 240
~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~
The End of U-2 Overflights o
=-=-=~
ain an China ............................. 242
Peripheral M issions by Detachment H ................... .......................... 244
Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246
Improvements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247
Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ... ... ............. 247
Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249
A New Version of the U-2 ...................................................... ........... 251
Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs............. ........ .......... 253
The Final Years of the U-2 ................. ................................................ .... 253
Support to Ot her Agencies .... .......... .................................................. 254
Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255
The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257
0) Chapter 6
The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968
The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .... ................ 260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270
Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274
The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277
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See, et NOFOAN
New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's Hig h Speed ............. 279
Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................ ....... .. ... .... 281
Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283
Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART.............................. ......... 283
Delivery of t he First OXCART ............................................ .................... 286
Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286
OXCART' s First Flights.............. ... .............................. .... ..... .......... .. ......... 288
Speed-Related Problems .... .. ........................................ ........... .... ............. 290
New Versions of the OXCART ............................ ............ ..... .................. 291
The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292
Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295
Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297
First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304
The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307
Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312
Summary of t he OXCART Program ...................................................... 313
♦ Chapter 7
Conclusion
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315
Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319
U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319
Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320
Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321
Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. ....... 321
♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325
♦ Appendix B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327
♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 ........................... 335
♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337
4 July 1954-1 May 1960
♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .................... .......... 339
♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347
♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355
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is Unclassified.
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ieeret NOFGftN
FOREWORD
This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita
tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program.
which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary
aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the
program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi
cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program,
along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the
CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and
permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and
Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais
sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in
this study.
The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the
CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART
projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted
problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an
enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July
1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence
on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed
for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program ·
managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover
age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions
over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt
ful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only
reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down
Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower
forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency
must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the
diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em
ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond
overhead reconnaissance programs.
Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is
the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA
records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The
authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and
have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in
formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned
-Sac,et
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See1et N0F0RN
reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does
reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno
logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national
pol icy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable
reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.
Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of
this volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript,
Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon
strated her high talent as a copy editor, and[ [provided
staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to
more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and
Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic
Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the
call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly
work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this
handsome volume.
Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W.
Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this
work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began
research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff
on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and
Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter
viewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning
to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member
of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns
Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence
officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow
undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized.
edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be
come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly
benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history
of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦
J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff
April 1992
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Secret l\10FeAN
PREFACE
When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947,
no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a
major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose
would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military
services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and
flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime.
By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and
growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its
satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had
been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration
overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost
and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important
areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais
sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct
deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers
feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could
lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non
military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be
manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the
greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance
program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air
Force provided vital support.
The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted
20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the
U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining
Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA
developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad
vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was
canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air
craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71.
Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in
formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to
the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA
U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years
See,et
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later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President
Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of
aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l
(strategic reconnaissance) versions.
The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject
of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B.
Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers'
memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many
more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael
Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and
National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac
curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to
classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable
amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the
public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of
the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's
overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions
on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers
more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the
OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air
craft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been
officially declassified and released.
After the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance
projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the
United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the
U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the
U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac
cess to classified documents by interviewing many former
participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also
quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller
on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(l 983).
There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and
OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and
Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by
SeeFet
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Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret
Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a
wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects
but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without
examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af
fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is
impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and
ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.
In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro
gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government
documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air
Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the
Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor
tant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in
overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen
tation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there
are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual
reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the
Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence
Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower
Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.
Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received
from many individuals who played important roles in the events they
recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance of Agency records management
officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance
program is also greatly appreciated.
To ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in over
head reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors
have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some
aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those
involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to
be described in very general terms. The omission of such information
is not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency's recon
naissance aircraft. ♦
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Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 1
1
Searching for a System
THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE
For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or
structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall
trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob
se_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better
view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it
became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi
tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance
proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von
Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: '·'The
nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next
1
war."
By World War II, lenses, films , and cameras had undergone many
improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster
than the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use
photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be
fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing
afteiwarcl
Peacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first in
cluded only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental high
ways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to
using photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II,
when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communi
cation between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.
' Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16.
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6cc. ct P.OFORN
Chapter 1
2
By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had
been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Sov iet
military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi
ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities
bomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap
ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air
defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory
policies, was also largely an unknown factor.
Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed
the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet
Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone,
telegraph, and radio-telephone-mo re secure, thereby greatly reduc
ing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu
rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively
blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents
using covert means to communicate intell igence, travelers to and
from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re
port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth
ods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence
tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other
methods were available.
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance
Although at the end of World War II the Un ited States had captured
large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet
Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source
of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was
interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To
obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence
community established several programs to debrief German scientists
who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but
were now being allowed to leave.~
: A t the end of World War II. th<! Bri tish had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor.
mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and
the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical
information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather
intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab
sorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<!
gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit
individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had
worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the
Returnee Exploitation Group ( REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of
s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[ I
) he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service
Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff.. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).
--- PAGE 16 ---
Sec, et NOF=ORI\J
Chapter 1
3
Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in
formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer.
As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying
to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force
effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of
the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and
electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking
by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com
pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also
lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the
air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of
any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights
(called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along
the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even
managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in
Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet
military response. 3
In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense
units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all
aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April
1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft
over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June
1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy'' to
the Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en
gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in
the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of
Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected
by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey
also reported attacks on their planes. 4
' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study
RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter
view by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS
Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study
are on file at the DCI History Staff.
' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New
York: Morrow, 1987) that "the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this
case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949." In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did
not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in
Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer.
George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).
-Seere:t
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Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 1
4
The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres
sive in August I952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating
Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home
island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft
stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re
connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become
a very dangerous business.
Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance
of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such
missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet
Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation
determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly
strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South
Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa
tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan
ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance
While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re
connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began
planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using
new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new,
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of
Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th
Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war
he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais
sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called
pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential
enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat
reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948,
Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa
bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution
cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu
nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the
Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development
Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951. 5
' Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC. 19 August 1985 (S).
SeoFat
--- PAGE 18 ---
~,etNOFOAN
Chapter 1
5
In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead
reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the
MIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that
an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet
fighters . Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began
looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World.
This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber
the Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra
had made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki
lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the
Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The
Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the
Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which be
gan flying in March 1950. 7
At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development
Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the
summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even
Richard S. Leghorn
higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber
version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft
Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb
er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new
Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new
Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that
was stressed to less than the standard military specifications.
Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000
feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin
ing fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi
fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a
radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo
graph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.
Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the
Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the
Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance
• 13.716 meters. To avoid givi ng a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s.
original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to
the metric system. To convert feet to meters. multipl y by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in
knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85.
' Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West
(Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I8.
--- PAGE 19 ---
Secret i'JOF'OfUd
Chapter 1
6
RAF Canberra Mark-PR3
division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to
approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit
reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications.
According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special- pur
pose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais
sance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance
aircraft shou ld be capable of operating under wartime conditions.
Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifica
tions for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes,
armor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to
reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights o f the Soviet
Bloc. The final result of Leghorn's concept after its alteration by
Pellegrini ·s staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude
Seeret
--- PAGE 20 ---
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
7
was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection
of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952
to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development
Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~
In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the
Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked
closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol
lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre
Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais
sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World
War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air
Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.
Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance
was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that
the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup
plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584
(Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to
90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component
quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn
ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar
could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal
range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of
the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn,
Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to
65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning
radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would
not be activated. 9
The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un
like Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar
technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im
proved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad
vocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.
' Leghorn interview (S).
' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).
SeeFet
--- PAGE 21 ---
iHret NOFORN
Chapter 1
8
The Air Force Search for a Ni:tw
Reconnaissance Aircraft
With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growi ng, several Air
Force agencies began to develop ain aircraft to conduct such mis
sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development
Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine
the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft
to give it long, high-l ift wings and tlhe American version of the new
Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that
Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year."'
At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air
Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin
ing ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with
two German aeronautical experts--Woldemar Voigt and Richard
Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air
Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft
that would combine the high-altitude perfonnance of the latest turbo
jet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti
tudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought
Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was
serving as assistan t chief of the New Developments Office of
WADC's Bombardment Branch.
By March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-alti
tude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for "an aircraft
weapon system having an operational radius of 1.500 nm [nautical
miles) and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance
missions during daylight, good visibility conditions." The require
ment stated that such an aircraft must have an optimu m subsonic
cruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the target.
carry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment.
11
and have a crew of one.
The Wright Air Development Command decided not to seek pro
posals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a
smaller company would give the new proj ect a higher priority and
'" Phi lip G. Strong. Chic:f. Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. '" Recon
naissance Capabilities." 21 August I 953. OSI records (S).
" Jay Miller. uKkheed U-2. Aerograph 3 (Aus:tin. Texas: Acrofax. 1983). p. 10.
Seeret
--- PAGE 22 ---
Chapter 1
9
produce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft
Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and
Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con
tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to
examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al
titude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three
firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a singl.e-en
gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial
of 67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67
(later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and
Martin's design was a big-wing version of the 8-57 called the Model
294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and
other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend
ing designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell
proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim
project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more
advanced concept from Bell was still being developed. 11
Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod-
••ify" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But
word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had
reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design.
Lockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft
competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had
recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director
of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon
on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend
and colleague from the Air Force's Office of Development Planning
(more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office
symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying
aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about
the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit
able for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance .
Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian
official in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that
'' The request for proposal. known as ··Design Study Requirements. ldentiticatic1n No.
53WC-J6j07:· has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U·Z, pp. 10- 11.
--- PAGE 23 ---
Secret ld0F8RN
Chapter 1
10
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft
Designs for the Air Force
competition for a high-altitude would have co reach altitudes of between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and
reconnaissance aircraft correctly forecast, "If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in
a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8. it should be
capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960."
Carter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which
will have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before
1960 will. of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary
procedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy." Some of the
"nonstandard" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the
elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications.
and the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed
with a warning that time was of the essence: " In order that this spe
cial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful l ife, it is obvious
that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid
ered normal. .. 1•1
Lockheed's senior officials approved Carter's proposal, and
early in 1954 the corporation's best aircraft designer-Clarence L.
(Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the
CL-282 but later to become famous under its Air Force designa1tor
the U-2. Already one of the world's leading aeronautical engirneers,
Kelly Johnson had many successful military and civi lian designs to
his credit. including the P-38, P-80, F-I04. and Constellmtion.
Johnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the
fuselage of the F-I04 jet fighter but incorporating a high-aspect--ratio
sailplane wing. To save weight and thereby increase the aircraft"s al
titude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of
" Milkr. U1''kheed U-2. p. 12.
-See,oc
--- PAGE 24 ---
/
Chapter 1
11
gravity (g's) instead of the mi litary specification strengLh of 5.33 g's.
For the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonaf
terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the
same engine he had chosen for the F- 104, which had been the basis
1
for the U-2 design). " Many of the CL-282's design features were
adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detacihable.
Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two
skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing- a common saillplane
technique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other tea
tures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot prnyload
area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL--282's
maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile
range. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled
gl "d
I er. .~•
Early in March 1954, Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 de
sign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development
Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and
recommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson
. sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a
full description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and
maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s that
included Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant
for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force.
Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civi lian officials were very
16
much interested in his design but the generals were not.
The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in early April
by Eugene Kiefer. Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of
" Lockheed Corporation. ··strategic Reconnai ssance and Intelligence ... Development
Planning Note #I. 30 November 1953 (U).
" Miller. locklctted U-2. p. 12. For more: J.:tails on Kdly Johnson's original pr,:,posal.
see '"Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircrati
Corporation. 5 March 1954'" in Helen H. Kkyla and Robert D. o ·Hem. Hiswrv of the
Office of Special Activities. DS&T. Directorate of Science an<l Technology Hi~:torical
Series OSA-1. 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). Th,: 16
volumes of this history contain 20 chaptr:rs . .:ach paginated separately. Future rd,:rcm;,;;s
will be shorten,:d to OSA Hiswry. follow<:!d by the rekvant chapter and pag<:! numbers.
•· Kelly Johnson Papers. ··Log for Project x:· April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation.
Advanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California.
Sec,et
--- PAGE 25 ---
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
12
Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay
The Lockheed CL-282
stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth,
and told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he
would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not
interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left
the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time."
Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force
development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air
Development Command in mid-May.. Seaberg and his colleagues care
fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early
June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's
choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at
Wright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most
powerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and
Bell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing
gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."
Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission
was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re
connaissance experts had gained their practical experience during
" C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U).
" Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12.
See1et
--- PAGE 26 ---
Sect et NOFORN
Chapter 1
13
World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography
experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as
the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre
ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length
cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with
the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de
vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to
be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed.
Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that
two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a
spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re
cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable
than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning
if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19
On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air
Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine
and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already commit-
ted to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air
Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for
28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began
seeking new sources of support for the aircraft.
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA
Although the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of
the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin
ued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of
the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for
Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott.
Gardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because
before coming to Washington he had headed the Hycon
Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena,
California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on
the CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this
'" Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California,
20 May 1985 (S).
'" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 7 June 1954.
iaaret
--- PAGE 27 ---
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
14
design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet
Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant,
Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary
Talbott.~'
According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander
LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri
marily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intell igence. But
General LeMay had already showni that he was not interested in an
unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA
support for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official
involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the
A ir Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carryi ng bal
loons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details
of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however.
served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in
formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!!
Trevor Gardner
Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on
12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve lopment Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly
Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this
meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search
for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:
Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re
ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell. ...
The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been
given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a
jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day
Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic
speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an
altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of
1,400 nautical miles. ... The CL-282 can be manufactured
" Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach . tape recording. Wa.shington. DC.
23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd"y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2
Affuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79.
" Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though
he was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve.
For S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the
Norton interview (S).
6ee,ot
--- PAGE 28 ---
Set1 el NOP'OAN
Chapter 1
15
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this
plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years..
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor
mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de
sign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro
cess of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new
Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked Philip Strong
S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hi red
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell .
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"'
Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be
fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud
ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M IT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 unt il the
end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United
'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.
'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS
Codeword).
Gee,et
--- PAGE 29 ---
Chapter 1
16
States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up
rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly
concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations
against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: "I know I emerged from
that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief
would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than
25
human means of intelligence collection.
Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became
involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc
cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the
concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the
idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad
vise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the
0
Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.!
Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al
titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to
Richard M. Bissell, Jr. ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an
overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar.
Dulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the
other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met
on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air
Force finally turned down in October I 954.!'
Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over
flight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un
dertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be
come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the
Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.
" Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89.
,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence.
from Chief. Support Staff, OSI. " Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and
Technical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job
S0R-0 1424. bo" I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape
recording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S).
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and
Coordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. --overflight of
Kapustin Yar.'' 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo" I (TS. down
graded 10 S).
Secret
--- PAGE 30 ---
iac;ret l)IQFORL'I
Chapter 1
17
Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit
well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli
gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,
1
which relied on agents rather than technology. s
At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers
among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key
decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To
make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional
source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov
ernment advisory boards.
SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had
played a major role in advising the government on technical matters
during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific ad-
visory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing DC/ Allen W. Dulles
te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci-
entific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a
Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of
current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of
new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense
Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the
Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•
The BEACON HILL Report
In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be
cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about
targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new
ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air
Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air
" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald
E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t
(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.
"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'
USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:
USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).
--- PAGE 31 ---
Secret ~OfiORN
Chapter 1
18
defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these
experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head
quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which
soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con
sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.
The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P.
Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M.
Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science
Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System
Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation;
Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the
Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour
Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col.
Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer. 30
During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study
Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and
firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel
members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re
connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and
camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess
ful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible.
This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted,
nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet
along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using
a large lens to photograph targets of interest. 31
After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the
BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem
bers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their
recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of in
telligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified
"' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence
and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app.
A (S. downgraded to C).
'' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985
(U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC, 24 April 1985 (S}.
Sec1et
--- PAGE 32 ---
Sec. et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
19
document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated
radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel
ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo
graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and
microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad
vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda
tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft:
We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl
edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten
tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it
with the maximum amount of information obtainable through
aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such
aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles
flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point
permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they
can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of
detection or interception. 1J
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack
The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON
HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon
naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became
President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with
the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities
and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11
To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili
tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap
peared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity
with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in
the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than
US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months
after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto
nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech
nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US
'' BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by
Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
See,e'l
--- PAGE 33 ---
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
20
scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming
into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the
leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen
bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And,
at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen
sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the
developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign
policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such
as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a
menace to peace and world order.
The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a
threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United
States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed
out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by
Soviet long-range bombers.-'•
Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental
United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new
Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of
Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later
designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the
turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared
to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then
going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow
May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel
ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the
Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented
a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex
perts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's
large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to
pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of
1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight
ing the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison
bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1;
" RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a
Surprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California:
the RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967).
'' "AF Cites Red Bomber Progress," Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; "Is Russia
Winning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, 'pp. 28-19;
"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'." Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; "Red
Air Force: The World's Biggest." Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33.
Sec,et
--- PAGE 34 ---
Sec, et NOf'Oft~
Chapter 1
21
•.. g,.,
au£ • Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber
(the Bison)
..
~: ... .
.
:-.·~·~ .'
~~~f':.:l-f.Je.) \': .
The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel
Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears
that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the
United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory
body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the
BEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and
high-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems
Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study
Group: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the
Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by
Edward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and
31
Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). '
The chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a re
search associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been
involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940, when he first advised
the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then estab
lished a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard
University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality
"' Mc:moram.lum for Rolxrt Amory. Jr.. Dt::puty Direclor. lnlelligence from Edward L .
Allen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operation:s Staff.
OSI. "Meeling of lhe Intelligence Systems Panc:l of th.: Scientific Advisory Board.
USAF:· 26 Augusl 1953. OSI (OSWR) records. job 80R-0l 424. bo:< I (S).
Seeret
--- PAGE 35 ---
Secret l\'JOFOAl\1
Chapter 1
22
lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing
cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory
moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as
long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at
Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new
head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research
Laboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not
end with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University,
because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais
sance. 17
The [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To
provide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet
Union, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best
intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog
raphy taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the
German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the
Urals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not
included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide
up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force
agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments
and proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance, in
cluding new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites.
Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi
ple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and
RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighter conversion"-for
adapting a giant, I 0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and
retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re
connaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-alti
tude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by
the summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnais
sance aircraft. 3~
" Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of
BGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force)
formt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston
University (Leghorn interview [SJ).
" :\lemorandurn for Robert Amory. Jr.. Deputy Din.:ctor. lntc:lligence. from Edward L.
Allen. Chief. Economic Research, ORR. and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff.
OSI. "Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientitic Advisory Boar<l. USAF,''
26 August I 953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Cha<lwell. Assistant Director/Scientific
lnrelligence. from Chief. Support Staff. OSI. .. Review of OSA Activities Concerned with
Scientific an<l Technical Collection Techniques... 13 May I955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records.
job S0R-01424. bo:< I (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 !S) .
..Sasret
--- PAGE 36 ---
See1 et NOFOftN
Chapter 1
23
The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were
all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect
intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be
yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying
balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political
consequences.
British Overflight of Kapustin Var
The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air
craft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN,
which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude
reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard
Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in
195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the
Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls
Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The
range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on
29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n
Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a
high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to
photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad
vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli
gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise.
Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.")
Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of
1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come
until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study
aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi
cials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23
March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board
at Langley AFB, Virginia.
'" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI.
Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21
October 1953," 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS,
downgraded to S).
~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss,
Mayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there
is no evidence to support this assertion.
GeeFot
--- PAGE 37 ---
Sec, et NOFOAP~
Chapter 1
24
Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's
Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its
members about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they
were not cleared for this information . The panel did. however. discuss
the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US
Canberra, the B-57."
The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282
The next Intell igence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25
May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem
ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval
uated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft
Company. Even wichout Martin 's specifications or drawings,
Donovan had been able to estimate what cou ld be done to the 8-57 by
lengthening the wings and l ightening the fuselage. He had determined
that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnais
sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,
he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to
Allen F. Donovan
military specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly
above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep
tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need
10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.':
Developme nt of such an aircraft was already under way.
Donovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly
ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas
on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.
When he was finally able to make this tri p in late summer,
Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been
seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L.
Eugene Root. an old Air Force acquai ntance who was n,ow a
Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi
tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then
showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life
long sailplane enthusiast. Donovan im mediately recognized that the
.,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).
Geeret
--- PAGE 38 ---
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 1
25
CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain
ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais
sance of the Soviet Union successfully: 1
Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with
James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence
Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how
ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24
September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several
members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at
tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com
petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.
But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design
for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis
tened intently.
Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception.
Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re
quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane
wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored
single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli
able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could
theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained,
it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet,
where it was sure to be shot down.
The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in
technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was
needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet en
gine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because
of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti
mated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6
percent of its sea-level thrust.
Finally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport
aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maxi
mum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and
" Donovan interview (S)
Seeret
--- PAGE 39 ---
Set1et NOl'ORN
Chapter 1
26
wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man
dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much
weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail
plane wing.
In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000
feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical
equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane
meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's
CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the
CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft
because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....
Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel
of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·
A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and
high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back
ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds
to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was
already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional
support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282
project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on
high-level advisory committees.
The Technological Capabilities Panel
The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned
over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on
the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed
by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack
might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met
with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's
Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not
deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise
attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the
Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to
" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.
--- PAGE 40 ---
~ et PdOfiOP\r\J
Chapter 1
27
Gardner. the committee members decided to approach President
Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them
about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that
these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United
States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili
tary surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this
problem.is
T he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the
most prominent members . MIT President James R. Killian. Jr. , to
meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston
area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assess
ment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April
1954, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the
President endorsed the concept.
On 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killian to re
cruit and lead a panel of experts to study "' the country's technologi
cal capabilities to meet some of its current problems." Killian
quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office James R. Killian, Jr.
B_u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into
three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive.
and i ntelligence capabilites. with an additional communications
working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabi lities
Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the
next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa
rate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings
with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish
ments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on
the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members
began drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was
ready. one of the three working groups took actions that would have a
major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had
" Beschloss. MC1ydav. pp. 73-7-': Technolog ii:al C:1pabi li1ies Pan.:I of 1he Science
Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Auack. I-i February 1955. p. 185
(hereafter cited as TCP Report) CTS/ Rcs1ri<:1eJ Dat:1. <lowngrnJed to S) .
.. Jamc:s R. Killian. Jr.. Spmnik. Scie111ists. and Eisettlww,:r: A Memoir of the r;;_~t
Special Assiswnr to the Pre.~ide11t for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press .
1977), p. 68: Beschloss. ,W<1yJay. p. 7-i: TCP Reporr. pp. 185- 186 (S).
Secret
--- PAGE 41 ---
Secf@t NOl'OPU'-.t
Chapter 1
28
Technological Capabilities Panel
IThe President of the United States I
Director, Office of
Defense Mobilization
Executive Staff Technological Capabilities Military Advisory
Panel of the Science _ _ Committee
David Z. Beckler, ODM Advisory Committee
Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF Lt. Gen. L. L Lemnitzer, USA
Steering Committee RAdm. H. 0. Felt, USN a
Administrative Staff Brig. Gen. 8. K. Holloway,
J. R. Killian, Jr., Director USAF a
William Brazeal J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a
M. Comerford L. A. OuBridge
• Constitute military consultant
C. Klett J. P. Baxter group.
L Wiesner M. G. Holloway
E. Hockett J. H. Doolittle
D. _Le_wis L. J. Haworth
K. Welchold E. H. Land
R. C. Sprague, Consultant
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Communications
Working Group
M. G. Holloway, Dir. L. J. Haworth, Dir. E. H. Land, Dir.
E. P. Aurand E. Barlow J. G. Baker J. 8. Wiesner, Chmn.
R. L. Belzer D. Dustin J.Kennedy G. W . Gilman
S. C. Hight R. Emberson A. Latham, Jr. H. T. Friis
R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford
E. H. Plesset B. McMillan J. W. Tukey
W. Stratton R. Rollefson Subcommittee
J. West H. Scoville. Jr.
C. Zimmerman M.A. Tuve H. A. Affel
B. Horton R. Gilruth W. 8. Davenport, Jr.
J. L Morton R. H. Scherer
J. Mouzon
Consultant for Technical Agency Contacts
Personnel
LKacl.We.he.r._e;IA
H. D. Chittim ___JCIA
S. R Clements, DOD
--- PAGE 42 ---
Sec, ct NOl'OP\111
Chapter 1
29
the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capab ilities. Its
chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fi l
ter and the instant camera. When James K illian asked Land to head
Project Three, Land had to make a major dec ision about his caree:r. At
the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from
Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on
the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land
decided to give up his interest in cinema's th ird dimension and return
1
east to Polaroid and the panel appointmem!
Land's Project T hree was the smallest of the three Technological
Capabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called " tax icab
committees··-committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab.
The Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and
Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of
Washington University, St. Louis: mathematician John W. Tuke:y of
Princeton University and Be ll Telephone Laboratories : and A llen
Latham, Jr.. of Arthur D. Little. l nc., an engineer and former treasurer
of the Polaroid Corporation:~ Edwin H. Land
[n mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington t,o ar
range for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project
Three study group. As the briefings progressed. the pane l members
became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation' s in
telligence resources. Land later noted, "We would go in and interview
generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor
ried. Here we were, five or six young men. asking questions that these
high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Prnject
Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central
Intelligence Agency.~·1
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly
Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the: Air
Force had rejected it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan
'' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. C:imbridgc.
Massachusetts. 2 November 198-' (S); Land interview (TS Codcword).
" TCP Report. p. 188 (S).
,., Land interview (TS Codeword).
Sec,et
--- PAGE 43 ---
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 1
30
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not
realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same.
As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however,
he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are
after." 50
A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual
drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be
came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker
had heard Allen Donovan ·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in
May, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan
did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24
September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing
a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51
At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen
Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard
Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas
as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais
sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un
clear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding
academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian
through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access
to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel
members to consider him the best CIA point of contact.
Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282
project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he
could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954,
Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his
staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro
grams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF,
on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's
'" Baker interview (S).
" Ibid.
'' Bissell interview (S).
iaeret
--- PAGE 44 ---
Secret l'<JOFOAN
Chapter 1
31
attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized
aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282. 53
By September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had be
come very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in
terest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen
Donovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting
of the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land com
mittee decided to back the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he
probably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept
and immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance
system.
During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance
equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer
than IO participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government
official in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceed
ings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited
- Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S.
Perkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For
discussions on the 157 engine, the panel members asked Perry W.
Pratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson
also met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system. 5~
By the end of October, the Project Three meetings had covered
every aspect of the Lockheed design. The CL-282 was to be more
than an airplane with a camera, it was to be an integrated intelli
gence-collection system that the Project Three members were confi
dent could find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber
fleet and, thus, resolve the growing "bomber gap" controversy. It was
not just the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the Land group's fan
cy; the plane was seen as the platform for a whole new generation of
aerial cameras that several committee members had been discussing
since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings.
James Baker was in the process of developing a revolutionary new
·'·' Memorandum for DOC! Charles Pearre Cabell from R. M. Bissell, Special Assistant
to the Director for Planning and Coordination, "Aerial Reconnaissance,"' 24 September
I954, DCI Records, job 80-B- I 676R. box 25 (TS. downgraded to S).
"' Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82.
Sec,et
--- PAGE 45 ---
Secret NelFOAN
Chapter 1
32
camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and
the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight
film. 55
By October l 954, the Project Three study group had drafted a
complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the
CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct
the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were
not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.
Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro
voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked
aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission
was the Central Intelligence Agency. 56
In late October l 954, the Project Three panel discussed the
CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of
the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,
Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the
project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even
ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore, the
DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu
man operatives and secret communications. the classic forms of intel
ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the
impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair
play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced
that technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new
camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems. 57
A Meeting With the President
Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did
not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it
was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.
Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence
Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on
how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter
mined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
" Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
Scere~
--- PAGE 46 ---
Secret NOfiORN
Chapter 1
33
to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis
sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence
community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct
line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:
Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President
Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem
oirs contain an account of this crucial meeting:
Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and
recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to
our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap
proved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it
should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not
become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department
or troubled by rivalries among the services. 58
The scientists from the advisory committees and the President
were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should
be controlled by the CIA, not the military.
- ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282
Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work
ing to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed
overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly
urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:
Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think
overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure
that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons
why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force
assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action
and technique that is right for the contemporary version of
CIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always
supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we
feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in
scientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing
such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present op
portunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to
start. 59
" Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot
be detennined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954.
,. Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles, 5 November 1954, in OSA History,
chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
Sec,et
--- PAGE 47 ---
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 1
34
The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com
plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the
CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a
three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for
Comprehensive Intelligence."
Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the
Project Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282
program over traditional espionage methods:
We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them
go efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and
indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to
such positive information as can thus be provided. 60
The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the
CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air
Force, noting that "For the present it seems rather dangerous for one
of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The
committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282
rather than an Air Force aircraft:
The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a
good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light
(15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military
usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if
through some remote mischance it were detected and identi
fied_ 61
One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air
Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster
completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee
that his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months
after he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was
not scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956.
The strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists on the
various advisory committees concerned with overhead reconnais
sance, combined with President Eisenhower's support, finally won
"'' Memorandum for DCI Allen F. Dulles from Project Three Panel, "A Unique
Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," 5 November 1954, p. 3 (TS, downgraded to
S) in OSA History, chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
•• Ibid.
&eaFet
--- PAGE 48 ---
~eeret NOF6ftr<J
Chapter 1
35
over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the
support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared
that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's
own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October
1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L.
Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar
gued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air
worthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force
in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and
an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were
diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there
would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs
of the X-16 prograrn. 62
Having heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack
on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met
with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed
design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists
from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to
discuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also
present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air
Development Command, who later recalled:
What I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of
all four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance
capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the
Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57,
being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in
my opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be
good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I
overlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney en
gine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and
Fairchild designs. 63
This meeting-along with the knowledge that President
Eisenhower also supported the CL-282-helped win over the Air
Force. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon
the X-16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying .
•, Donovan interview (S).
•-' Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13.
Secret
--- PAGE 49 ---
Sec, et NOP'ORl\1
Chapter 1
36
On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci
sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de
veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak
ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of I 9 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem
orandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
"" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.
6eerati
--- PAGE 50 ---
Sec, et NOi-ORN
Chapter 1
37
President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower
told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and
that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it
operational. 66
Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technol
ogy primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the
Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft,
President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project
conducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all,
the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
6,
sance system.
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting at the White House:·
24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss.
Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the
President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS.
declassified).
" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In
February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly
urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed
the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations
by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report
was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project
Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of
electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific
Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land
Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of over
head reconnaissance.
President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice
he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence mat
ters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and
upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which be
came the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the
first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position
Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by
the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.
See,et
--- PAGE 51 ---
. ~--·-·· ~8 ~.
~l0-,vi l
.,.. . . : .
--- PAGE 52 ---
Sec, et NOPOPU~
Chapter 2
39
Developing the U-2
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT
On 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles
called his special assistant. Richard Bissell, into his office to te:ll him
that President Eisenhower had just approved a very secret program
and that Dulles wanted Bissell to take charge of it. Saying it was too
?~cret for him to explain, Dulles gave Bissell a packet of docuiments
and told him he could keep it for several days to acquaint himself
with the project. Bissell had long known of the proposal to build a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, but only in the most general
terms. Now he learned in detail about the project that proposed send
ing aircraft over the Soviet Union.
Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to
go to the Pentagon on the following day to represent the Agency at an
1
organizational meeting for the U-2 project. Before leaving, Bissell
asked Dulles which agency was to run the project. The DCI replied
that nothing had been clearly decided. Bissell then asked who was
going to pay for the project. Dulles answered: "That wasn'li even
2
mentioned. You'11 have to work that out."
Bissell was accompanied by Herbert I. Miller, chief of the Office
of Scientific Intelligence's Nuclear Energy Division, who soon be
came the executive officer of the overflight project. When Bissell and
Miller arrived at the Pentagon on the afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they
' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U-2 until July 1955, this
study will use the more widely known designator to avoid confusion.
1
Bissell interview {S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 1 {TS Codeword).
5earet
--- PAGE 53 ---
Secret 1\101'0~1\1
Chapter 2
40
sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor
Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very lit
tle time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the !Pro
ject, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the secuirity
matters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting
Air Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney
J57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeop
ardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to tum ov,er a
number of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-:52s,
KC- l 35s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay fo r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because
they all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose
from his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the rnee1ting
3
adjoumed.
After the meeting. Bissell told Dulles that the CIA would hav,e to
use money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project
James A. Cunningham, Jr. going. The DC! used this fu nd to pay for covert activities, following
approval by the President and the Director of the Budget. Dulles 1told
Bissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the over
fli ght program and to start putting together a staff for Project
AQUATONE. the project's new codename.
At first the new " Project Staff" (renamed the Development
Projects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell. Miller, and the
small existing staff in Bissel l's Office of the Special Assistant to the
DCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the pro
ject, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955
the project staff added an administrative officer, James A.
Cunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the
Directorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for
the next lO years. Two other key project officials who began their du-
~ in 1955 wer~ ] the finance officer, and c==i
L _ l the contracting officer."
' OSA History, chap. 3. p. 2 (TS Codeword): Bissell interview, 8 November 1984 (S);
Beschloss, Maydt1y. p. 89.
• OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 6-7. chap. 4, pp. 1-2. chap. 5. pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword);
Chronology of rite Office of Speda/ Activities. 195.J• /968. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). p. 2-4 (TS
Codeword) (hereafter cited as OSA Chronology).
--- PAGE 54 ---
Gee, ct NOfOftN
Chapter 2
41
============
J
AOUATONE
Project Personnel
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Planning and Coordination
I
Headquarters
CIA
USAF
I
-1]
25
I I I I
US Field Test Base Foreign Field Base A Foreign Fielcj Base B Foreign Field Base C
CIA 26 CIA 16 CIA 16 CIA 16
USAF 34 USAF 34 USAF 34
Contract 52 Contract 52 Contract 52
26 102 102 102
Total employees: CIA
USAF
Contract
During the firs t hal f of 1955. the project staff grew slowly: many
of the individuals working on overhead reconnaissance remained on
the rolls of other Agency components. To achieve maximum security,
Bissell made the project staff self-sufficient. Project AQUATONE had
its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistic, com
munications, and security personnel , and, thus, did not need to tum
to the Agency directorates for assistance. Funding for Proj,ect
AQUATONE was also kept separate from other Agency components;
its personnel and operating costs were not paid out of regular Agency
accounts. As approving officer for the project, Richard Bissell could
obligate funds in amounts up to $100,000; larger sums requ ired i.he
1
DCl's approval.
At the end of April 1955, Bisselrs staff developed, and the
Deputy Director for Support approved, the firs t table of organization
for Proj ect AQUATONE. Once operational. the project would have a
' OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 5-7 (TS Ccxkword).
--- PAGE 55 ---
Sec.ct NOFOAN
Chapter 2
42
The Matomic Building
total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test
ing faci lity. and three foreign field bases. C IA employees represented
only one-fourth (92) of .the total. The Air Force personnel commit
ment was larger, with l09 positions on the 1955 table of organization
(th is total does not include many other Air Force personnel, such as
SAC meteorologists. who supported the U-2 project in addition to
their other duties). The largest Project AQUATONE category was
contract employees, with 156 positions in 1955. This category in
cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel from other contractors for
6
items such as photographic equipment.
The first project headquarters was in CIA's Administration (East)
Building at 2430 E Street, NW. Continued growth caused the
AQUATONE staff to move several times during its first two years.
On l May l 955, the project staff moved to the third floor of a small
red brick building (the Briggs School) at 2210 E Street, NW. Then on
3 October. the staff moved to Wings A and C of Quarters Eye, a
World War fI "temporary" building on Ohio Drive. NW. in the West
Potomac Park area of Washington. On 25 February l956, the project
staff moved again. this time to the fifth floor of the Matomic Building
• Proj,:ct AQUATONE Table of Organization. 28 April 1955 in OSA History. chap. 3, an
neK 15 (TS Codeword).
Secret
--- PAGE 56 ---
Seth!l NOFORN
Chapter 2
43
at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years
until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in
March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project
staff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved
1
to the Tyler Building in Tysons Comer, Virginia.
Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the
DDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved
in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project.
Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly
in overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the
U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the
U-2 for the DCI.
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AOUATONE
Although Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding
for the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29
November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a
team of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take
them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why
to their former supervisors. T he engineers immediately began to work
45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded
to a total of 8 1 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65
8
hours.
Kelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft with
out a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this pro
gram: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement.
Lockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process,
having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.
Covert funding for sensiti ve projects sirnpli fies both procure
ment and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to
the Federal Government and there is no public accountabi lity for their
' OSA History. chap. 18. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword); OSA Chronology. pp. 4. 7. 10. 45 (TS
Codeword).
• Johnson. '"Log for Project X ... 29 November-3 December 1954 (U).
-Sec.et
--- PAGE 57 ---
Sasret NOFORN
Chapter 2
44
use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,
designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government
employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouch
ers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competi
tive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about
a given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the
Federal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project
without resorting at each step to the mandated procurement proce
dures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also
permits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy
corporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destina
tion or use of the various purchases.
In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI
Dulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund
to finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project
OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance
specifications., rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifica
tions," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed
that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original pro
posal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s
equipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General
Counsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26
million for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air
Force was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could
only budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance
of the available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two
sides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a re
view three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were
going to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No.
SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery of the
first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to
keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for
$1,256,000 I ~nd mailed it to Kelly Johnson's
home on 21 February 1955. 9
• John S. Warner. Oftice of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,
Washington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S): OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex
42 (TS Codeword): Johnson, "Log for Project X," 21 February 1955 .
.Searet
--- PAGE 58 ---
6eeret NOFOAN
Chapter 2
45
As it turned out, no review of the contract was necessary at the
three-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time
but under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring
of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed on a price for the
original 20 aircraft of $17,025,542 plus a profit of $1,952,055 for a
total of $18,977,597-less than $1 million for each aircraft. Because
its design was based on Lockheed's F-104, the U-2 was relatively in
expensive even though only a small number of aircraft had been or
dered. Only the wings and tail were unique; Lockheed manufactured
the other portions of the aircraft using the F-104's jigs and dies.
MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF THE U-2
Aware of the great need for secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson
placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank,
California, known as the Skunk Works. 10 Lockheed had established
this highly secure area in 1945 to develop the nation's first jet aircraft,
the P-80 Shooting Star. The small Skunk Works staff began making
the _detailed drawings for the U-2, which was nicknamed the "Angel"
because it was to fly so high.
Kelly Johnson's approach to prototype development was to have
his engineers and draftsmen located not more than 50 feet from the
aircraft assembly line. Difficulties in construction were immediately
brought to the attention of the engineers, who gathered the mechanics
around the drafting tables to discuss ways to overcome the difficul
ties. As a result, engineers were generally able to fix problems in the
design in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. There was no empha
sis placed on producing neatly typed memorandums; engineers sim
ply made pencil notations on the engineering drawings in order to
keep the project moving quickly. 11
A little more than a week after he had been authorized to begin
the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23-page report detailing his most
recent ideas on the U-2 proposal. The aircraft, he explained, would be
designed to meet load factors of only 2.5 g's, which was the limit for
transport aircraft rather than combat planes. The U-2 would have a
'" The Lockheed '"Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known
as the .. Skonk Works" in Al Capp·s comic strip Li'/ Abner.
11
Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach
and Gregory W. Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988.
6eeret
--- PAGE 59 ---
Secret NOfi6fltN
Chapter 2
46
·\......,. - ~... :: · ··•:Jt·1 "' .... 1._., ~ .
.. ·• ~i~·;'"; ~·- . ·•.
< >. ~)\~~,-~,
Skunk Works Design Staff
speed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum alti
tude would be 70,600 feet and the lllltimate maximum altitude would
be 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifica
tions, the new plane would take off at 90 knots, land at 76 knots, and
be able to glide 244 nautical miles from an altitude of 70,000 feet.
After discussing the reconnaissance bay with James Baker, Johnson
had worked out various equipment combinations that would not ex
ceed the weight limit of 450 pounds. Johnson ended his report by
promising the first test flight by 2 August l 955 and the completion of
four aircraft by I December I955.':
" Kell y Johnson. ·• A High-Altitude: Rcconnai~san(;C: Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.
Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ).
SeeFet
--- PAGE 60 ---
Secr&t PJOFOFU'd
Chapter 2
47
In designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with
two major problems-fuel capacity and weight. To achieve interconti
nental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply of fuel, yet, it
also had to be light enough to attain the ultrahigh altitudes needed to
be safe from interception. Although the final product resembled a typ
ical jet aircraft, its construction was unlike any other US military air
craft. One unusual design feature was the tail assembly, which-to
save weight-was attached to the main body with just three tension
bolts. This feature had been adapted from sailplane designs.
The wings were also unique. Unlike conventional aircraft, whose
main wing spar passes through the fuselage to give the wings continu
ity and strength, the U-2 had two separate wing panels, which were
attached to the fuselage sides with tension bolts (again, just as in sail
planes). Because the wing spar did not pass through the fuselage,
Johnson was able to locate the camera behind the pilot and ahead of
the engine, thereby improving the aircraft's center of gravity and re
ducing its weight.
The wings were the most challenging design feature of the entire
airp~ane. Their combination of high-aspect ratio and low-_drag ratio
(in other words, the wings were long, narrow, and thin) made them
unique in jet aircraft design. The wings were actually integral fuel
tanks that carried almost all of the U-2's fuel supply.
The fragility of the wings and tail section, which were only
bolted to the fuselage, forced Kelly Johnson to look for a way to pro
tect the aircraft from gusts of wind at altitudes below 35,000 feet,
which otherwise might cause the aircraft to disintegrate. Johnson
again borrowed from sailplane designs to devise a "gust control"
mechanism that set the ailerons and horizontal stabilizers into a posi
tion that kept the aircraft in a slightly nose-up attitude, thereby
avoiding sudden stresses caused by wind gusts. Nevertheless, the U-2
remained a very fragile aircraft that required great skill and concen
tration from its pilots.
The final major design feature was the lightweight, bicycle-type
landing gear. The entire structure-a single oleostrut with two light
weight wheels toward the front of the aircraft and two small,
solid-mount wheels under the tail-weighed only 208 pounds yet
could withstand the force of touchdown for this 7-ton aircraft. Because
both sets of wheels were located underneath the fuselage, the U-2 was
also equipped with detachable pogos (long, curved sticks with two
small wheels on them) on each wing to keep the wings level during
takeoff. The pilot would drop the pogos immediately after takeoff so
Seeret
--- PAGE 61 ---
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 2
48
U-2 at testing site before
attachment of wings and
tail assembly
that they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its
front and back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of
1
the wingtips, which were equ ipped with landing skids. )
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMERA SYSTEM
By December 1954, Kelly Johnson was at work on drawings for the
U-2's airframe and Pratt & Whitn•:!Y was already building the J57 jet
" For the design ft:atures of the U-'.! in early 1955. see R. F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:
Reconnaissance Aircraft . Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January 1955.
pp. 7-9. OSA Records. job 74-B-6-l5. box I (S).
--- PAGE 62 ---
Sec. et NOFOAN
Chapter 2
49
.. ·-
. ·. • ,• ..
.:;~~~~;.\ii ~1i:
• ~:; ..:. ~ .::,, , ',t •... . , " •.
h -;.:
. .-:.:.~~-
...___ ... : ~·-'~•-·
,:..- ....
: .~:~~·~-~~~~:~;\ ~f~ ' •
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engine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras.
U-2 landing gear and pogos
Existing cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to
be used in high-altitude reconnaissance.
The workhorses of World W'ilf II aerial photography had been the
Fairchild K-19 and K-21 framing cameras with lenses of varying focal
lengths from 24 to 40 inches. Late in the war, the trimetrogon K-17
.mapping-camera system came into use. This system consis~ed of lhree
separate cameras which made three photographs simultaneously: a
vertical, an oblique to the left, and an oblique to the right The major
shortcomings of the trimetrogon system were the large amount of film
required and the system's lack of sharp definition on the obliques.
The standard aerial cameras available in the e'ilfly 1950s c:ould
achieve resolutions of about 20 to 25 feet (7 to 8 meters) on a side
when used at an altitude of 33,000 feet (10,000 meters), or about 25
lines per millimeter in current tenns of reference. Such resolution was
considered adequate because aerial photography was then used pri
marily to choose targets for strategic bombing, to assess bomb dam
age after air raids, and to make maps and charts. Unfortunately, a
camera with a resolution of only 20 to 25 feet at a height of 33,000
feet was too crude to be used at twice that altitude. lndeed, for intelli
gence purposes a resolution of less than 10 feet was necessary to dis
cern smaller targets in greater detail. This meant that any camera
carried to altitudes above 68, 000 feet had to be almost four times as
good as existing aerial cameras in order to achieve a resolution of less
than 10 feet As a result, some scientists doubted that useful photogra
phy could be obtained from altitudes higher than 40,000 feet.'"
" Baker imervil!w (S).
.Sea,et-
--- PAGE 63 ---
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 2
50
The first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in
+ ·~;~ ,·\ ·~~:f~: .i ~ ~~\ ~~
the mid- I940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S.
;.;.,-::., .
Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut,
collaborated on a design for an ex.perimental camera for the Army Air
Force. They developed a 48-inch focal-length scanning camera that
was mounted in a modified B-36 bomber. When tested over Fort
Worth, Texas, at 34,000 feet, the new camera produced photographs
in which two golf balls on a putting green could be distinguished (in
reality. however, the "golf balls··· were 3 inches in diameter). These
photographs demonstrated the high acuity of Baker's lens, but the
camera weighed more than a ton and was much too large to be carried
aloft in an aircraft as small as the U-2.
Realizing that size and weiglht were the major restraining factors
in developing a camera for the U--2. James Baker began working on a
radically new system in October 1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would need almost a year to produce a working model of such a com
plex camera. Since Kelly Johnson had promised to have a U-2 in the
James G. Baker
air within eight months, Baker needed to find an existing camera that
could be used until the new came:ra was ready. After consulting with
his friend and colleague Richard Perkin. Baker decided to adapt for
the U-2 an Air Force camera krnown as the K-38. a 24-inch aerial
framing camera built by the Hycon Manufacturing Company of
Pasadena, California.
Perkin suggested modifying several standard K-38 cameras in
order to reduce their weight to the U-2's 450-pound payload limit. At
the same time, Baker would ma:ke critical adj ustments to existing
K-38 lenses to improve their acuiity. Baker was able to do this in a
few weeks, so several modified K-38s, now known as A-1 cameras,
were ready when the first "Angel" aircraft took to the air in
15
mid-1955.
CIA awarded Hycon a contract for the modified K-38 cameras,
and Hycon, in tum. subcontracte:d to Perkin-Elmer to provide new
lenses and to make other modifications to the cameras in order to
make them less bulky. In its tum, Perkin-Elmer subcontracted to
Baker to rework the existing K-38 lenses and later design an im
proved lens system. To keep his liens-designing efforts separate from
" Ibid.
See,et
--- PAGE 64 ---
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 2
51
A-1 camera
his research associate duties at Harvard and his service on go,vem
ment advisory bodies, Baker established a small firm known as Spica,
Incorporated, on 31 January 1955.
The A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 framing
cameras. One was mounted vertically and photographed a 17.2° swath
beneath the aircraft onto a roll of 9.5- inch fi lm. The second K-38 was
placed in a rocking mount so that it alternately photographed the left
oblique and right oblique out to 36.5° onto separate rolls of 9.5-inch
fi lm. The film supplies unwound in opposite directions in ordler to
minimize their effect on the balance of the aircraft. Both cameras
used standard Air Force 24-inch focal-length lenses adjusted for max
imum acuity by Baker. The development of the special rocking mount
by Perkin-Elmer's Dr. Roderic M. Scott was a major factor in neduc
ing the size and weight of the A- I system, because the mount pro
vided broad transverse coverage with a single lens, ending the need
for two separate cameras. 16
•• OSA History. chap. I. annt!x 3, pp. 1-3 (TS Co1kword).
SeGF&t
--- PAGE 65 ---
Settet N0FORl)I
Chapter 2
52
A-2 camera
U-2s equipped with the A- I camera system also carried a
Perkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch film and a 3-inch lens.
This device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs of the
terrain passing beneath the aircraft. Because the A - I system was: new,
it also included a backup camera system. a K-17 6-inch three-camera
trimetrogon unit using 9-inch film.
W hi le the A -1 system was still being developed, James )Baker
was already working on the next generation of lenses for high-alrtitude
reconnaissance. B aker was a pioneer in using computers to synthesize
optical systems. His software algorithms made it possible to model
lens designs and determine in advance the effects that variatio,ns in
lens curvatures. glass compounds. and lens spacings would have on
rays of light passing through a lens. These .. ray-tracing" programs re
quired extensive computations, and, for this he turned to the most
modem computer available, an IBM CPC (card-programmed callcula
17
tor) installation at nearby Boston University.
" Ibid.. chap. I. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword).
-Seeret
--- PAGE 66 ---
Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 2
53
Baker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the
A-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of prob
lems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of
three separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines.
One K-38 filmed the right oblique, another the vertical, and a third
the left oblique. The A-2 system also included a 3-inch tracking
camera. All A-2 cameras were equipped with the new 24-inch f/8.0
Baker-designed lenses. These were the first relatively large photo
graphic objective lenses to employ several aspheric surfaces. James
Baker personally ground these surfaces and made the final bench tests
on each lens before releasing it to the Agency. These lenses were able
to resolve 60 lines per millimeter, a 240-percent improvement over
existing lenses. 18
Once Baker and Scott had redesigned the 24-inch lens for the
K-38 devices, they turned their attention to Baker's new camera de
sign, known as the B model. It was a totally new concept, a high-reso
lution panoramic-type framing camera with a much longer 36-inch
f/10.0 aspheric lens. The B camera was a very complex device that
- used a single lens to obtain photography from one horizon to the
other, thereby reducing weight by having two fewer lenses and shutter
assemblies than the standard trimetrogon configuration. Because its
lens was longer than those used in the A cameras. the B camera
achieved even higher resolution-100 lines per millimeter.
The B camera used an 18- by 18-inch format, which was
achieved by focusing the image onto two counterrotating but overlap
ping 9. 5-inch wide strips of film. Baker designed this camera so that
one film supply was located forward, the other aft. Thus, as the film
supplies unwound, they counterbalanced each other and did not dis
turb the aircraft's center of gravity.
The B camera had two modes of operation. In mode I, the
camera used a single lens to make seven unique exposures from 73.5°
on the far right and far left obliques to vertical photos beneath the air
craft, effectively covering from horizon to horizon. Mode II narrowed
the lateral coverage to 21 S on either side of vertical. This increased
the available number of exposures and almost doubled the camera's
" "Basic Configuration and Camera Data:· 24 January 1956. OSA Records (TS
Codeword); OSA History, chap. 5. annex 44 (TS Codeword).
Seeret
--- PAGE 67 ---
&ee1 et NOFOAN
Chapter 2
54
B camera .
operating time. Three of the seven B-camera frames provided stereo
coverage. The complex B cameras were engineered by Hycon's chief
designer, William McFadden.'"
James Baker's idea for the ultimate high-altitude camera wa:s the
C model that would have a 240-inch focal length. In December 1954,
he made preliminary designs for folding the optical path using three
mirrors, a prism, and an f/20.0 lens system. Before working ouIt the
detai ls of this design, however, Baker flew to California in early
January 1955 to consult with Kelly Johnson about the weight and
space limitations of the U-2·s payload compartment. Despite eve~y ef
fort to reduce the physical dimensions of the C camera, Baker ne,eded
an additional six inches of payload space to accommodate the bigger
lens. When he broached this subject to Johnson, the latter replied,
" Six more inches? I'd sell my grandmother for six more inches!I" ~
•·• Ibid.: Bakl!r interview (S),
'' Bakc:r intl!rvkw (S).
--- PAGE 68 ---
6ee1 et NOFOfitM
Chapter 2
55
Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too
heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch
f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, re
sulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight
and space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the
mirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica mate
rial developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced
the weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a
180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the
past, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have
taken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer
program, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.
When a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January
l 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length,
which was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the
camera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty
in aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engi
neers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years
later, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.
The failure of the C camera design was not a serious setback to
the high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera
proved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-trans
port system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of
high-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is
still in use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after
September 1958.
During the period when he was designing lenses for the CIA's
overhead reconnaissance program, James Baker was also working on
classified lens designs for the Air Force and unclassified designs for
the Smithsonian Institution. To protect the security of Baker's work
for the Agency, Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff told
Baker to work on lenses for the U-2 in the open and not make any
effort to classify the documents connected with the project. Miller be
lieved that by not calling attention to the effort through the use of spe
cial security measures, the project could be completed faster and still
not be compromised. This "hiding in the open" strategy proved very
successful?
" Ibid.
$ee,et
--- PAGE 69 ---
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 2
56
In addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other im
portant item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James
Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, the optical peri
scope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the aircraft and also
proved to be a valuable navigational aid. 22
PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2
As work progressed in California on the airframe, in Connecticut on
the engines, and in Boston on the camera system, the top officials of
the Development Projects Staff flew to California and Nevada to
search for a site where the aircraft could be tested safely and secretly.
On 12 April 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland (the se
nior Air Force officer on the project staff) flew over Nevada with
Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's
chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier. They spotted what appeared to be an air
strip by a salt flat known as Groom Lake, near the northeast corner of
the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground.
After debating about landing on the old airstrip, LeVier set the plane
down on the lakebed, and all four walked over to examine the strip.
The facility had been used during World War II as an aerial gunnery
range for Army Air Corps pilots. From the air the strip appeared to be
paved, but on closer inspection it turned out to have originally been
fashioned from compacted earth that had turned into ankle-deep dust
after more than a decade of disuse. If Le Vier had attempted to land on
the airstrip, the plane would probably have nosed over when the
wheels sank into the loose soil, killing or injuring all of the key fig
ures in the U-2 project. 23
Bissell and his colleagues all agreed that Groom Lake would
make an ideal site for testing the U-2 and training its pilots. Upon re
turning to Washington, Bissell discovered that Groom Lake was not
part of the AEC proving ground. After consulting with Dulles, Bissell
and Miller asked the Atomic Energy Commission to add the Groom
Lake area to its real estate holdings in Nevada. AEC Chairman Adm.
Lewis Strauss readily agreed, and President Eisenhower also ap
proved the addition of this strip of wasteland, known by its map des
ignation as Area 51, to the Nevada Test Site. The outlines of Area 51
" Information supplied by James Baker to Donald E. Welzenbach, 12 May 1986 (U).
'·' OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sea,at
--- PAGE 70 ---
~ M t N6f0Ri\J
Chapter 2
57
are shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area
Area 51, the Ranch
adjoini ng the northeast comer of the much larger Nevada Test Site. To
make the new facility in the middle of nowhere sound more attractive
to his workers. Kelly Johnson called it the Paradise Ranch, which was
soon shortened to the Ranch. !•
Although the dry lakebed could have served as a landing strip.
project managers decided that a paved runway was needed so that
testing could also take place during the times when rainwater runoff
from nearby mountains filled the lake (at such times the base acquired
yet another unofficial name, Watertown Strip). By July 1955 the base
was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began
moving in.
'' OSA History, chap. 8. pp. 2-6 (TS Co,kword): John:;on, "Log for Projectx:·::?5-29
April I955: Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnso n with Maggi<! Smith. Kelly: More Thun My
Share of Ir All (Washington. DC: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1985). p. 123.
Sec,et
--- PAGE 71 ---
.. . .. ·. .
.•.
........ ....
Area 51
Oregon 0 20-
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Area 5 1
_,,.,...
- ~
·: - .
AEC/Vevada
.......
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•
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·. ' . •...
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--- PAGE 72 ---
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 2
59
SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT
On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air
Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2)
in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary respon
sibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project
(AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for
the security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a
heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to
keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine
which contractor employees require security clearances and has had
to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing fa
cilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has
been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25
The most important aspect of the security program for the U-2
project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for
the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the
U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of
_CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.
The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also
played a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnais
sance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the
Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with
each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots
were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known
as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise air
craft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article num
bers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as
KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot).
Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell
into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords
or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication of the
nature of the program. '6
-
Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement
of CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altime
ters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the
" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).
,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).
Secret
--- PAGE 73 ---
Sec,st NOFORN
Chapter 2
60
devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi
cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes. 27
THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni
formed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it." 28
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen
cies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities
Project OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codename for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract
ing, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the
n Ibid.
,. OSA History. chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.
ieare:&
--- PAGE 74 ---
See, el N61-0ftN
Chapter 2
61
project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex
9
clusive province of Lockheed.~
As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the
program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As
Richard Bissell later remarked about the U-2 project, "The Air Force
wasn't just in on this as a s upporting element, and to a major degree it
wasn't in on it just supplying about half the government personnel;
but the Air Force held, if you want to be precise, 49 percent of the
30
common stock."
One of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE
was Col. Osmund J. Rieland. He began coordinating Air Force a:ctivi
ties in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27
June 1955, Rieland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief
of Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4
August, the day after the signing of the CIA- Air Force agreement. ln
March 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was fol
lowed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.
Osmund J. Rieland
. . . - Another Air Force officer. Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary. joined the: pro
gram in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966. l1onger
than any of the other project managers. Using the Air !Force
Inspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Otificer,
AFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense
Department support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His 11 years
with the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of
Air Force continuity.J•
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT
To get the U-2 aircraft ready to Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the
need for a fuel that would not boil off and evaporate at the very high
altitudes for which the aircraft was designed. Gen. James H. Doolittle
,. OSA History. chap. 3. p. 15 and annex 14 (TS Codeword).
•• Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquaners. 12 October 1965 (TS Codc::word).
" Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary (USAF-Ret.). interview by Donald E. Wc:lzc:nbach. tape re
cording, 3 April 1986 (S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 3 (TS Codtword).
Secret
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See, el N61'0Rl\1
Chapter 2
62
(USAF. Ret.), a vice president of the Shell Oil Company who had
long been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a
member of the Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell
to develop a special low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel
for the craft. The result was a dense mixture, known as LF-1 A, JP-TS
(thermally stable), or JP-7, with a boiling point of 300°F at sea level.
Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts that
Shell normally used to make its "Flit" fly and bug spray. In order to
produce several hundred thousand gallons o f LF-1 A for the U-2 pro
ject in the spring and summer of 1955. Shell had to limit the produc
tion of Flit. causing a nationwide slhortage. Because of the new fuel' s
density, it required special tanks .:11nd modifications to the aircraft's
fuel-control and ignition systems.)~
Even more important than the problem of boiling fuel was the
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